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BOOK REVIEW
GOING FOR THE BRASS RING: THE CASE FOR
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Arthur S. Leonardt
THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CMLIZED
COMMITMENT. By William N. Eskfidge, Jr." New York: The Free Press.
1996. Pp. 296. $25.00.
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the issue of same-sex marriage burst into the conscious-
ness of the American public. Although lesbian and gay litigants and
their lawyers began bringing the issue before the courts a quarter of a
century earlier,' all attempts to secure same-sex marriage rights
through litigation had been unsuccessful until 1993. In that year, the
Hawaii Supreme Court ruled, in Baehr v. Lewin, 2 that the Hawaii Con-
stitution might be construed to compel the state to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples.8 After the court granted the state's mo-
tion for clarification and issued a second opinion confirming its first,4
it remanded the case to the state circuit court for trial. The Hawaii
legislature promptly amended the state's marriage law to assert its un-
derstanding that marriage should only be available to opposite-sex
t Professor, New York Law School; Editor-in-Chief, LESBIAN/GAY LAw NoTEs. The
author acknowledges research assistance by Charles Wertheimer, New York Law School,
Class of 1997.
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
1 SeeJones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185
(Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 522
P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
2 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
3 In Baehr, the Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs, three
same-sex couples, had a fundamental right to marry under the state constitutional right of
privacy, which it found to be co-extensive with the federal constitutional right of privacy.
However, the court concluded that limiting the right to marry to opposite-sex couples cre-
ated a sex-based classification. The Hawaii Constitution, unlike the Federal Constitution,
expressly forbids sex discrimination. In a ruling of first impression, the court held that sex
is a suspect classification under the state constitution. Consequently, the burden falls on
the state to prove that any sex-based classification is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55-67.
4 See id. at 74-75.
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couples 5 but refrained, at that time, from attempting to overrule the
court by constitutional amendment.
There the matter sat as the trial date was repeatedly postponed
until 1996, when opponents of same-sex marriage-perhaps reacting
to pretrial publicity and speculation that same-sex marriages lawfilly
consummated in Hawaii would have to be honored in other states
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion 6-began to introduce bills in various state legislatures declaring
same-sex marriages to be unauthorized and violative of the states' pub-
lic policies. Although more than thirty state legislatures considered
such bills, only sixteen passed them.7 Congressional opponents of
same-sex marriage introduced and then passed the Defense of Mar-
riage Act of 1996.8 The Act sought to relieve states of any obligation
under the Constitution to recognize same-sex marriages from other
states, and introduced into the United States Code for the first time a
definition of marriage for purposes of federal law.
Same-sex marriage appeared likely to become a major issue in the
1996 presidential campaign, as Republican candidates seeking votes in
the Iowa caucuses attended or endorsed a nationally-televised rally
5 See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Michie Supp. 1996).
6 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, andjudicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id.
7 See Lisa Keen, 21 State Legislatures Mull Same-Sex Marriage Ban, WASH. BLADE, Feb. 7,
1997, at 1. States that passed laws in 1996 explicitly banning same-sex marriage and, in
most cases, asserting that same-sex marriages performed in other states would not be rec-
ognized in their state, include: Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 1996); Arizona,
Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (West Supp. 1996); Delaware, DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101
(Michie Supp. 1996); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (Michie Supp. 1996); Idaho,
IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1996); Illinois, 1996 Ill. Legis. Serv. 324 (West); Kansas, KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 23-101 (1995); Michigan, 1996 Mich. Legis. Serv. 324 (West); Missouri, 1996 Mo.
Legis. Serv. 172 (Vernon); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (Supp. 1996);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3.1 (West Supp. 1996); Pennsylvania, 1996 Pa. Legis.
Serv. 124 (West); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996);
South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie Supp. 1996); and Tennessee, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (1996). In addition, the governors of Alabama and Mississippi is-
sued executive orders commanding executive branch officers of those states to refrain
from recognizing same-sex marriages. See Alabama Same-Sex Marriages Banned by Governor,
LA TIMES, Aug. 31, 1996, atA17; Ronald Smothers, Mississippi Governor Bans Same-Sex Mar-
riages, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at 7.
8 Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (to be codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7
and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). The Act does two things: (1) it provides that no state is required
to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states, and (2) it provides that for
purposes of all federal laws, marriage shall be defined as the union of one man and one
woman. See id. For a detailed discussion of the Defense of Marriage Act, see A Recommenda-
tion Against the Passing of H.R. 3396; S. 1740: A Bill to Define and Protect the Institution of
Marriage, 51 REc. ASS'N B. Crrv N.Y. 654 (1996) (Report of the Committees on Lesbians
and Gay Men in the Legal Profession; Sex and Law; and Civil Rights).
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against same-sex marriage.9 But President William J. Clinton's
prompt endorsement of the Defense of Marriage Act, which was co-
sponsored in the Senate by leading Republican presidential con-
tender and Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, effectively removed the
same-sex marriage issue from the presidential campaign. Both houses
of Congress passed the bill by overwhelming margins during the sum-
mer,10 and the President signed it into law before the election."
Meanwhile, in Hawaii, the Baehr case finally went to trial on Sep-
tember 10, 1996, the same day the Defense of Marriage Act passed the
Senate. Although the national media did not focus much attention
on the trial, 12 the December 3, 1996 release of Circuit Judge S.C.
Chang's holding that the state had failed to meet its burden to justify
the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of the mar-
riage' 3 sparked a fury of media commentary.' 4 The verdict renewed
9 See Richard L. Berke, With the Field Now Scrambled, Iowans Prepare to Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1996, at 26 (noting that Republican presidential candidates either participated in,
or sent letters of support to, a rally against same-sex marriage sponsored by a Christian
group in Des Moines, Iowa).
10 The House approved the bill by a vote of 342-67 on July 12, 1996. The Senate
approved the bill by a vote of 85-14 on September 10, 1996. See 142 CONG. REc. H7,505
(daily ed.July 12, 1996); 142 Cong. Rec. S10,129 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996). In both cases,
the voting followed extended, vociferous floor debate.
I1 President Clinton signed the bill just after midnight on September 21, 1996. See
Clinton Draws Critiismfrom Gay Activists, CHI. TRniB., Sept. 23, 1996, at 6.
12 As one reporter commented:
Hawaiian authorities were expecting such a media circus, they imposed
strict rules to prevent chaos in the court, even instituting a lottery for ad-
mission. But very few of the spectators who squeezed into Judge Kevin
Chang's tiny First Circuit courtroom were reporters from the national
press. The result was that those trying to follow the trial from across the
country struggled with an almost total media blackout, even though the
proceedings began on the very day that the U.S. Senate passed the inflam-
matory Defense of Marriage Act, an act prompted by this very trial.
Gabriel Rotello, Courtship Rituals, Our, Jan. 1997, at 106, 107.
'3 Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). Lawrence H. Miike,
the Director of the Hawaii Department of Health, was substituted for his predecessor as
named defendant
14 See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, A Step Down the Aisle BosToN GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1996, at D7;
James Kunen, Hawaiian Courtship-Gay Marriage May Become Legal in the Islands Without Nec-
essarily Coming to a Chapel Near You, TIME, Dec. 16, 1996, at 44; David Mixner, No One Has to
Send a Gift-I Have a Right to Marry-Even if Others Disapprove TIME, Dec. 16, 1996, at 45;
Mike Royko, Court Ruling Makes Hawaii Even a Better Honeymoon Locale, CHI. TaRB., Dec. 5,
1996, at 3; Mike Royko, Gay Marriage Today, Polygamy Tomorrow, CINCINNATI POST, Dec. 13,
1996, at 23A Robert Scheer, A Warped Vriew of What's Proper as Family Life, SAN DIEGO UNION
& TRI., Dec. 13, 1996, at B7; Daniel Sneider, Judges Raise Conservative Hackles But Scholars
Say Court is Fulfilling its Constitutional Duty, CHISr. SC. MON., Dec. 6, 1996, at 3; Andrew
Sullivan, Hawaiian Aye: Nearing the Altar on Gay Marriage, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 29, 1996, at
15; Cal Thomas, Courts Undermine a Holy Institution, ST. Louis PosT-DisP., Dec. 6, 1996, at
21C; George Will, Even Conservatives Resort to Courts, ST. Louis POsT-DIsP., Dec. 9, 1996, at
7B.
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efforts to pass bills against same-sex marriage in state legislatures, 15
and it increased the likelihood that opponents of same-sex marriage
in Hawaii will attempt to place a constitutional amendment on the
state ballot to overrule the decision of their highest court.
In the midst of the furious same-sex marriage debates of 1996, a
voice of calm reason emerged from the pages of The Case for Same-Sex
Marriage written by William N. Eskridge, Jr.'6 Professor Eskridge is
deeply involved in this debate; he was counsel for the plaintiffs in the
other great same-sex marriage case of the early 1990s, Dean v. District
of Columbia. 7
Craig R. Dean and Patrick G. Gill filed suit in the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia on November 26, 1990.18 They claimed
that the District's marriage ordinance could be construed to allow
same-sex marriage, and that the failure to allow same-sex marriage
would violate the District's Human Rights Act,19 which bans discrimi-
nation in public services on the basis of sex and sexual orientation.20
Dean, a lawyer, represented the couple alone until Professor Eskridge
offered to take the case pro bono. The Superior Court rejected the
plaintiffs' challenge, holding that the District of Columbia's mar-riage
law should be construed consistently with the court's perception of
the historic meaning of marriage in Western Civilization: the union of
one man and one woman. 21 As such the Human Rights Act, accord-
ing to the Superior Court, did not require the city to authorize
licenses for same-sex marriages. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals agreed with the Superior Court's holding, and it also rejected
15 According to a legislative update released via the Internet by Boston's Forum on
the Right to Marriage on December 16, 1996, opponents of same-sex marriage were ex-
pected to introduce new bills in California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Montana, North
Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. A petition drive in Maine has collected enough
signatures to place a measure against same-sex marriage on that state's ballot, and a similar
drive has been launched in Oregon. And Hawaii legislators have begun talking about a
state constitutional amendment to overrule the widely-anticipated decision by the Supreme
Court affirmingJudge Chang's ruling. See Forum on the Right to Marriage, Legislative Up-
date (visited Dec. 16, 1996) <http://www.calico-company.com/formboston/>. The New
Jersey legislature began hearings on a same-sex marriage ban during December 1996. See
Ralph Siegel, N.J. Senate Committee Approves Bill Banning Same-Sex Maniages, PHIA. INQUIRER,
Dec. 17, 1996, at B10.
16 WILLIAM N. ESRRIDGE,JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SExUAL LIBERTY
TO CiviLizED COMMrrMENT (1996).
17 653 A.2d 307 (App. D.C. 1995).
18 See Arthur S. Leonard, Gay Washingtonians Sue for Marriage License 1991 LESBIAN/
GAY LAW NOTES 3; Homosexuals' Suit Seeks Marrge License, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1990, at A19.
19 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1992).
20 See Dean, 653 A.2d at 309.
21 See id.
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the same kind of sex discrimination argument that the Hawaii
Supreme Court accepted in Baehr.22
Eskridge's litigation team put together comprehensive briefs on
the history of same-sex marriage and the legal arguments that could
be mounted in support of their case.2 3 In The Case for Same-Sex Mar-
riage, Eskridge takes these litigation materials as his starting point. He
then expands and elaborates on them to present a thorough argu-
ment for the proposition that the state should eagerly support the ef-
forts of same-sex couples who wish to get married, and he argues that
federal constitutional requirements of due process and equal protec-
tion require the state to allow same-sex marriage. The book carries
the full apparatus of legal scholarship, but is, in essence, a Brandeis
brief for same-sex marriage. The essence of Eskridge's argument is
that allowing same-sex marriage would be a sound policy decision in
light of the benefits that would flow to society and same-sex marriage
participants. As the book's subtitle indicates, Eskridge believes that
admitting lesbian and gay Americans to the privileged circle of marital
couples will assist in assimilating them into the societal mainstream,
thereby reducing the civil strife that currently attaches to the issue of
homosexuality.
I
THE VOICE OF REASON: THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
After a brief introduction to his subject, Eskridge presents a re-
vised and expanded version of his earlier law review article on the
history of same-sex marriage.24 Concisely reviewing a growing body of
scholarship on certain non-Western and premodern Western socie-
ties, Eskridge attempts to show that a variety of cultures have accepted
the concept of the legal recognition of same-sex marriage.25 How-
ever, the scholarship on which Eskridge relies to make this point is
controversial.2 6 The concept of marriage varies over time and place to
such an extent that it would be impossible to assert with great confi-
22 See id. at 331-56. Judge Ferren, writing in partial dissent, would have remanded the
case for a trial to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny for sexual orientation discrim-
ination claims under the Equal Protection Clause. See id- at 356-58.
23 An intermediate development of these materials can be found in a law review arti-
cle written by Professor Eskridge. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 79 VA. L. REy. 1419 (1993).
24 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 15-70; Eskridge, supra note 23.
25 ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 15-70.
26 The most important sources cited by Eskridge include: JOHN BoswELL, CHISTIAN-
ITy, SocIAL TOLERANCE, AND HoMosExuALrry (1980); JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN
PREMODERN EUROPE (1994); KENNETH J. DOVER, GREEK HOMOSEXUALITY (1978); DAVID F.
GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1988). For a discussion of the con-
troversy surrounding this scholarship, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 223 n.37 (referencing
some of the scholarly critiques of Boswell's work).
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dence that the premodern and non-Western relationships that Es-
kridge cites can be treated as more than rough analogues for modern
Western marriage, with its vast array of legal rights and responsibili-
ties. Marriage is a socially-constructed institution that becomes more
complex every time a governmental body enacts a new law or regula-
tion that classifies individuals by their marital status. Critics of histori-
cal scholarship may correctly argue that reliance on the examples of
berdache marriages among Native Americans or same-sex commit-
ment ceremonies found in Catholic liturgy collections from the Mid-
dle Ages do not prove that those societies in fact treated the marital
status of same-sex couples the same as that of opposite-sex couples.
But establishing identical treatment is not really Eskridge's reason for
summoning the historical record. Rather, Eskridge seeks to show, and
indeed succeeds in showing, that societies other than modern West-
ern society have found it appropriate, in some circumstances, to ac-
cord a status akin to marriage to same-sex couples; thus, the idea is
not totally new.
Eskridge also catalogues the changes in social views underlying
the widespread hostility toward same-sex relationships in modern
Western societies.27 In the United States, an indeterminate number
of same-sex couples have found ways to live together despite social
hostility, but these relationships "have occurred primarily in the inter-
stices and at the fringes of society.''28 Eskridge highlights a few exam-
ples that have surfaced in the historical record of same-sex couples
who had maintained extended relationships, usually disguised in
some way, prior to the modern gay liberation movement.2 9 After
Stonewall,30 in 1969, growing numbers of lesbians and gay men de-
cided to become more open about their relationships, and advocates
of legally recognized same-sex partnerships became more common.
Eskridge quickly sketches the developments leading to the contempo-
rary movement for legal same-sex marriage, which has progressed in
Europe to the point where several Scandinavian countries have estab-
lished a legal registered partnership that carries most of the rights and
responsibilities of marriage and is available for same-sex couples.3 '
27 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 37-50.
28 See id. at 37.
29 See id. at 37-44.
SO Stonewall is shorthand for the police raid and ensuing public demonstrations that
occurred in Greenwich Village, New York, in June, 1969. These events are commonly be-
lieved to have sparked the modem gay and lesbian liberation movement in the United
States. SeeJOHN D'EMiuo, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 1 (1988).
31 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 49-50. The European countries mentioned by Es-
kridge that afford some type of family recognition to same-sex couples include Norway,
Sweden, and Denmark. See id. at 50. The Dutch Parliament has established a commission
to recommend legislation on the subject, after endorsing in principle the concept of same-
sex marriage. See id. at 50. Iceland passed registered parmership legislation inJune, 1996,
1997]
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Eskridge focuses his attention not only on the legal policy debates
accompanying these developments, but on the debates occurring
within religious bodies as well.3 2 The modem marital relationship has
roots in both religious and civil developments in premodern times.
Many people see the religious and civil aspects of marriage as closely
intertwined. Although civil marriage, performed by a judge or gov-
ernment official, is available in most cultures, many prefer that minis-
ters, priests, or rabbis who are licensed by the government perform
their marriages. If civil marriage for same-sex couples were to become
available, religious bodies would surely face requests to their clergy to
perform such ceremonies for same-sex couples. Anticipating these
developments, and responding to requests from same-sex couples to
perform religious ceremonies of commitment that presently lack any
legal status, national organizations of many of the Protestant and Jew-
ish denominations in the United States have been grappling with the
question for years.33 The more "liberal" denominations have
progressed to the point of allowing their clergy to perform religious
ceremonies for same-sex couples.34 Eskridge shows that even the most
conservative, fundamentalist Christian denominations, although offi-
cially forbidding clergy to engage in such activities, have examples of
"renegade" clergy who have performed them.35 Eskridge bolsters his
argument with an Appendix entitled "Letters from the Faithful on the
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage,"36 consisting of letters from
religiously-observant advocates of same-sex marriage that were submit-
ted to the court in Dean v. District of Columbia.3 7
Eskridge next addresses the debate over marriage as it has played
out within the lesbian and gay community.38 The pre-Stonewall move-
ment for gay rights in the 1950s and 1960s did not concern itself with
marriage. The more immediate issues confronting the movement
were the decriminalization of homosexual conduct and an end to offi-
cially sanctioned discrimination against homosexuals.39 At that time,
such ferocious hostility toward "open" homosexuality prevailed in so-
ciety that gay rights proponents saw the concept of officially recog-
after Eskridge's book appeared, and the Finnish government was studying the issue as well.
See International Notes, 1996 LESBIAN/GAY LAW NoTEs 103, 103-04.
32 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 46-48.
33 See id. at 47.
34 See id.
35 See id. at 48.
36 Id. at 193.
37 See id. app. at 193 (quoting from letters collected by plaintiffs in Dean v. District of
Columbia, No. CA 90-13892 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Dec. 30, 1991)).
38 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 51-85.
39 See id. at 52-53.
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nized marriages for same-sex couples as an absurd pipe dream.40
Indeed, it was common for gay rights organizations of the 1950s and
1960s to be very secretive, with members using only first names.
After Stonewall, however, "coming out" became an important
component of the fight for civil equality. For some gay people, this
meant seeking open access to all the institutions of society, including
civil marriage. Same-sex couples who were denied marriage licenses
filed several lawsuits in the early 1970s.41 However, these lawsuits were
not filed by gay legal organizations, which were then in the early
stages of formation and primarily focused on discrimination and sod-
omy-law reform. Furthermore, some organization leaders strongly
questioned the value of gay people participating in what was seen as
the quintessential heterosexual institution of marriage. For example,
one aspect of the liberationist philosophy, particularly embraced by
some lesbian feminist theorists, embodies a rejection of traditional so-
cial structures, and calls instead for gay people to evolve their own
family forms, tailored to their own needs, in order to avoid falling into
the stereotypical gender roles of traditional marriage.42
This debate, ongoing during the 1980s, surfaced formally in Out/
Look magazine with a pair of articles by Thomas B. Stoddard, then the
Executive Director of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc., and Paula L. Ettelbrick, then Lambda's Legal Director.43 Stod-
dard called for a renewed effort by the gay movement to attain access
to legal marriage, while Ettelbrick argued that marriage was not the
"path to liberation."44 Stoddard and Ettelbrick took their debate on
the road, addressed community meetings in several major cities
around the country, and received extensive coverage in the lesbian
40 See, e.g., Tom Ammiano, Who lAm: Being a Gay Man in the City, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb.
9, 1997, at Wll.
41 See cases cited supra note 1.
42 See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation , Our/LooK NAT'L
GAY & LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, reprinted in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE COMMIT-
MENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES 20-26 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992).
43 See Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Many, OuT/LoOK
NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, reprinted in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE
COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES 13-19 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992); Ettelbrick, supra
note 42, at 20. Stoddard retired from Lambda in 1992 and became active in the Campaign
for Military Service during 1993. After Congress enacted a new policy on military service
by gay people late in 1993, Stoddard retired from active law practice but continued to
teach on a part-time basis at New York University School of Law until his death from AIDS
in February, 1997. Ettelbrick left Lambda to become a policy specialist for the National
Center for Lesbian Rights, and she has most recently been employed as Legislative Direc-
tor of the Empire State Pride Agenda, a New York state-wide lobbying organization, while
teaching part-time at University of Michigan School of Law and New York Law School.
44 See Stoddard, supra note 43, at 13; Ettelbrick, supra note 42, at 20.
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and gay press. Their debate was played out in a steady stream of com-
mentary during the next few years.45
But the debate among the movement leaders proved irrelevant
for many in the lesbian and gay community who saw the issue in in-
tensely practical terms. A same-sex marriage ceremony presided over
by the Reverend Troy Perry, founder of the Universal Fellowship of
Metropolitan Community Churches, outside the national headquar-
ters of the Internal Revenue Service during the 1987 National March
on Washington for Lesbian and Gay Rights, drew thousands of partici-
pants, some dressed in formal marriage attire.46 The location of this
event was no coincidence, because the tax laws remain a major imped-
iment to financial equality between same-sex couples and legally mar-
ried opposite-sex couples.47 The large and enthusiastic turnout
reflected the mounting passion of many lesbians and gay men for the
right to obtain same-sex marriage.
Those who opposed same-sex marriage from within the lesbian
and gay movement on theoretical grounds advocate domestic partner-
ship, a form of nonmarital legal recognition, accompanied by a cam-
paign to revise individual government policies as necessary to take
account of nonmarried partners' interests. 48 The response of Es-
kridge to domestic partnership proponents is two-fold. First, only ac-
cess to marriage will provide true "equal citizenship" for same-sex
couples.49 Second, the lengthy catalog of legal rights adhering to
45 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 234-35 nn.3941. For a synopsis of Ettelbrick's cur-
rent views, see Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recog-
nition, 5J.L. & POL'Y 107 (1996).
46 See Linda Wheeler, 2,000 Gay Couples Exchange Vows in Ceremony of Rights, WASH.
POST, Oct. 11, 1987, at B1.
47 For example, same-sex couples cannot file joint returns and, upon the death of one
member of the couple, the survivor cannot benefit from the exemption from taxation of a
substantial portion of his or her inheritance that would be accorded a legal spouse. Per-
haps more significantly, in light of the recent spread of domestic partnership benefit plans,
the value of benefits provided to the partners of lesbian and gay employees is considered
taxable income of the employee, while such benefits provided to legal spouses are excluda-
ble from taxable income. See generally, Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax
Laws, 1 LAW & SxxuAsxrv 97 (1991).
48 Advocates of domestic partnership have achieved some measure of victory over the
past few years with the recognition of same-sex couples by numerous municipalities and
employers, as well as by some state governments. SeeArthur S. Leonard, Employee Benefits for
Domestic Partnership Families, in 48 N.Y.U. ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR PROCEEDINGS
(forthcoming 1997). One ardent advocate of domestic partnerships sought to persuade
the Hawaii legislature that adopting a broad domestic partnership bill might satisfy that
state's courts sufficiently to head off the pending same-sex marriage case. See generally
Thomas F. Coleman, The Hawaii Legislature Has Compelling Reasons to Adopt a Comprehensive
Domestic Partnership Act, 5 LAw & SExuALrY 541 (1995) (including a proposed framework
for comprehensive domestic partnership legislation and a draft bill for Hawaii). A bill
based on Coleman's proposal, 1995 Hawaii Sen. Bill No. 2419, passed the Hawaii Senate in
1996 but did not reach the floor in the House. See Coleman, supra, app. at 578-81.
49 See ESERIDGE, supra note 16, at 62-66.
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marriage should be available to same-sex couples wholesale through
one act of marriage, rather than through piecemeal law reform and
private legal planning, as would be required with the more limited
domestic partnership proposals.50 Eskridge observes that lesbians and
gay men cannot obtain some of the most important societal rights ex-
cept through marriage.5' Furthermore, Eskridge acknowledges that
legal marriage brings responsibilities as well as rights, and he argues
that the responsibilities imposed on married same-sex couples would
be good for them as well as for society. Eskridge argues that "the du-
ties and obligations of marriage directly contribute to interpersonal
commitment," and thus that the relationships of married same-sex
partners are likely to be much more enduring than the nonmarital
relationships to which such couples are now limited.52 And he asserts
that such long-term commitments are usually good for the individuals
involved in them, observing that in the time of the AIDS crisis social
institutions that promote stable relationships will benefit society as
well as the individual participants 5 3
Eskridge then refutes the notion that marriage is a "rotten institu-
tion" that would prove disadvantageous for lesbians and gay men, ar-
guing that this socially-constructed institution is constantly changing,
and that opening it up to same-sex couples will provide the opportu-
nity to change it furiher.54 A more telling argument against making
same-sex marriage the main goal of the lesbian and gay rights move-
ment is that attaining this goal may contribute to marginalizing those
lesbian and gay couples who prefer not to marry. Conceding this
point, Eskridge argues that marriage need not be an exclusive goal;
domestic partnership should remain on the table for both opposite-
sex and same-sex couples who wish to define their relationships differ-
ently from traditional marriage but whose relationships should also be
recognized for certain purposes on grounds of equity.55
50 See id. at 66-70. Eskridge provides a list of fifteen "rights and benefits associated
with marriage," but many of them are merely summary statements representing several
distinct rights. See id. at 66-67. Eskridge's list is similar to one provided by Georgia
Supreme Court Justice Leah Sears-Collins in her concurring opinion in Van Dyck v. Van
Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853, 855 (Ga. 1993) (Sears-Collins, J., concurring), which includes thir-
teen items and alludes to others.
51 For a detailed discussion of the central rights and responsibilities of marriage and
how they might apply to same-sex couples, see David L. Chambers, What jI. TheLegal Conse-
quences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L REv. 447
(1996). The Government Accounting Office has identified more than a thousand provi-
sions in federal statutes which base a right, entitlement, or responsibility on marital or
spousal status. See GAO/OCG, 1997 WL 67783 (Jan. 31, 1997).
52 See EsKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 70-74.
53 See id.
54 See id. at 75-80.
55 See id. at 77-80
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Finally, Eskridge confronts the argument that marriage is an "as-
similationist" goal of privileged, middle-class lesbian and gay Ameri-
cans who are unconcerned with the more "liberationist" aspirations of
the gay rights movement. This argument states that if marriage be-
comes available, affluent gays and lesbians will simply assimilate into
mainstream society. The result would be the further disempowerment
of gender rebels, people of color, and those of limited means, all of
whom rely upon the participation of the lesbian and gay middle class
to maintain a viable progressive political movement.56 Eskridge re-
sponds with several arguments. For one, he doubts that married
same-sex couples "would be just like married straight couples" or that
gay and lesbian culture would "cease to be distinctive," pointing out
ways in which the "families of choice" of gay people will differ from
those of their blood relatives. 57 More significantly, Eskridge maintains
that in the short term, society will likely treat same-sex married
couples as exotic. 58 Coming to the heart of his argument, Eskridge
maintains that access to legal marriage will result in a strengthening of
gay people's commitments to each other, reinforcing their family ties
to the ultimate benefit of themselves5 9 and the community.60 Es-
kridge emphasizes the special importance of this notion to gay men,
seizing upon the common stereotype that gay men are more promis-
cuous than lesbians, and thus more in need of social reinforcement to
make their relationships work.61 He also counters the argument that
people of color and those of limited means in the gay community
would be less likely to benefit from marriage, pointing out that polls
do not show less enthusiasm for marriage among these groups.62
Eskridge next turns to what he calls "mainstream objections to
same-sex marriages," which he divides into several broad categories:
"antihomosexual emotions"; "definitional objections"; "'stamp of ap-
proval' objections"; and "pragmatic objections."63 Eskridge eschews
any attempt to deal with the first objection, asserting that his argu-
ment is aimed not at those who irrationally hate and/or fear homo-
56 See id. at 80-83.
57 Id. at 81.
58 See id.
59 Cf Many Just Say No to Drugs, Drinks After They Say "I Do, " CHI. T iB., Feb. 3,1997, at
2.
60 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 82.
61 See id. at 83.
62 See id. Indeed, some of the important social benefits that may be significant for
these groups are readily accessible to married persons, especially parental rights. Eskridge
observes that one of the major problems encountered by lesbian mothers in custody and
visitation disputes is the courts' view of their relationships with their partners as illicit.
Same-sex marriage, according to Eskridge, would remove this problem. See id. at 83-84.
63 See id. at 87-122.
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sexuals, but rather at fair-minded people who have not made up their
minds on the same-sex marriage question.64
Definitional objections to same-sex marriage assert that because
the term "marriage" has traditionally been applied solely to opposite-
sex couples, it is inapplicable to same-sex partners. This is a recurring
theme in the pre-Baehr court decisions rejecting claims for a constitu-
tional right for same-sex couples to marry,65 as well as in religious de-
bates.66 Eskridge examines the historical evidence, and then he offers
a clever refutation to historical arguments based on genetics by point-
ing out the genetic anomalies that can blur gender lines in some
cases.67 Philosophical objections to same-sex marriage rest largely on
the contention that the purpose of social recognition for marriage is
to create the ideal setting for procreation and raising children, an ar-
gument premised on "natural law."68 Eskridge argues that there are
no necessary links among procreation, childrearing, and marriage.
Not all of those who procreate are married. Sterile, opposite-sex
couples can marry and then adopt children. 69 Same-sex couples can
have children, either through alternative insemination or adoption,
and are perfectly capable of raising them.70 Finally, religious tradition
is not monolithic in opposition to same-sex marriage. After observing
that in the United States religious precepts are not supposed to pro-
vide the basis for secular law, Eskridge argues that " [t]here is no univ-
ocalJudeo-Christian tradition against same-sex marriage."' Not only
does the Old Testament fail specifically to condemn same-sex mar-
riages, butJesus says nothing about them one way or the other in the
New Testament.72 Recent research has uncovered Roman Catholic
and Greek Orthodox liturgy from the Middle Ages that was apparently
used to bless same-sex unions.73 Perhaps more to the point, several
contemporary religious leaders have argued that the Christian and
Jewish faiths should embrace same-sex couples who wish to form sta-
64 See id. at 87 (" [V] isceral distaste is not susceptible to argument based on reason and
facts.").
65 See id. at 89.
66 See id. at 90.
67 See id. at 93-94. Eskridge refers to "intersexual" people, sometimes called
"hermaphrodites," whose physical appearance appears to blend features of both genders,
and to others born with extra X or Y chromosomes that express themselves through distor-
tion of genitalia. See id.
68 See id. at 96-98.
69 See id.
70 See id. at 110-11. Indeed, if a same-sex couple prevails on a relative to donate sperm
or to be the "surrogate" mother, the couple can produce a child who is genetically related
to both same-sex parents.
71 Id. at 99.
72 See i. at 99-100.
73 See id. at 100 (citing JOHN BoswELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PPSEMODFN EUROPE
(1994)).
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ble, committed relationships.7 4 In an Appendix, Eskridge reproduces
excerpts from statements in support of same-sex marriage prepared by
ministers, priests, and rabbis for submission to the court in Dean v.
District of Columbia.75
The "stamp of approval" objection comes from those critics who
contend that by authorizing same-sex marriage, the state will necessar-
ily send the message that homosexuality is acceptable and that homo-
sexual relationships are of equal value to heterosexual relationships.7 6
Proponents of this argument contend that same-sex marriage and ho-
mosexuality are always "bad," and that society should not make avail-
able to homosexuals a social institution that is seen as "good, even
blessed."77
Eskridge responds that although society clearly does send a
message that marriage is a desirable institution by granting it many
legal and social privileges, the state does not express approval of any
particular type of marriage or of how the participants in marriages
conduct their lives. 78 Indeed, historical restrictions on the right to
marry have been so reduced through legislative and judicial action
that, as Eskridge observes:
Virtually any man and woman of any persuasion or perversion can
qualify nowadays, and even if they do not technically qualify, they
can still get a license if they are brazen enough.... If the couple
wants to break the rules and sticks together on their rule breaking,
they can be legally married all their lives.79
Given the ease with which just about any opposite-sex couple can ob-
tain a marriage license in most states, Eskridge argues, "it is unsurpris-
ing that marriage law is not a vehicle for conveying moral approval or
disapproval of any particular form of marriage."80
74 See id. at 100-04.
75 See id. app. at 193-217 (quoting from letters collected by plaintiffs in Dean v. District
of Columbia, No. CA9O-13892 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Dec. 30, 1991)).
76 See id. at 104-05.
77 Id. at 104.
78 See id. at 105-09.
79 Id. at 106.
80 Id. at 107. As an example of this proposition, Eskridge notes:
Although every state freely gives marriage licenses to people convicted of
rape, no one regards this state tolerance as a stamp of approval for rape.
Although every state freely gives marriage licenses to people convicted of
child molestation, no one regards this state tolerance as a stamp of approval
for child molestation.
Id. at 107. One might add, somewhat incredulously, that a marriage license is apparently
available to someone who murdered a previous spouse. SeeWard v. Ward, 1996 WL 491692
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1996). Mr. Ward murdered his first wife, then remarried after
serving his prison term. He divorced his second wife and married a third time. After his
most recent remarriage, he sought custody of his daughter from his second marriage on
the ground that his traditional marital household was preferable to a lesbian household-
his second wife having begun a relationship with another woman. See id. at *1. In the
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Eskridge argues further that same-sex marriage is good for the
participants. In doing so, he cites social science research indicating
that same-sex couples gain the same psychological benefits from their
relationships that opposite-sex couples do.8 ' Eskridge then contends
that prohibiting same-sex marriage is actually antifamily, because it
condemns same-sex couples, whose sexual orientation is not some-
thing the state can affect in any way, to deprivation of those benefits of
family life that accompany a socially and legally recognized relation-
ship.8 2 And, as Judge Chang found in Baehr v. Miike, denying those
same-sex couples that have children the right to marry also deprives
their children of the benefits of having two officially-recognized par-
ents.8 3 Eskridge reinforces this argument by using anecdotes about
actual same-sex couples and their children.8 4
Pragmatists, who may be open to the arguments in favor of same-
sex marriage, nonetheless counsel caution and delay, raising practical
concerns about precipitate change in one of society's most basic insti-
tutions.8 5 Eskridge responds to this position with three arguments.
First, extending the existing institution of marriage to same-sex
couples need not require any changes in current marriage law, other
than revision of a few pronouns in some state domestic relations stat-
utes. This is because, according to Eskridge, there are no discernible
legal incidents of marriage that do not apply with equal effect to both
members of same-sex couples.8 6 Second, same-sex marriage would ac-
tually prove to be cost-effective for society. The civilizing effect of mar-
riage may actually contribute to reducing the spread of sexually-
transmitted diseases. Moreover, existing domestic partnership studies
show that same-sex couples are, on average, less expensive to insure
against health care costs than opposite-sex couples.8 7 Finally, allowing
same-sex marriage would be more efficient than the alternative sug-
gested by some pragmatists of adjusting individual govemment poli-
course of the litigation, Ward's daughter from his first marriage alleged that she had been
subjected to sexual abuse by him. See Monica Davey, Lesbian Mother. Father Who Killed ST.
PETERSBURG TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1996, at 1A Monica Davey, Value Clash in Custody Battle ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 2, 1996, at 1B; Bill Kaczor, KillerHas Custody of Daughter Because His
Ex-Wfe is a Lesbian, NEW ORLEANs TIMES-PicAyUNE, Feb. 3, 1996, at A4; Myriam Marquez,
Nice, New Wife Does Not Make Convicted Killer a Better Parent ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 2, 1996,
at A10. The trial judge decreed that the father's heterosexual household was preferable to
the mother's lesbian household, even though the father was a convicted wife-murderer. See
Ward, 1996 WL 491692, at *2. The appellate court affirmed this decision. See id. at *5. Has
the state stamped its approval on Mr. Ward's lifestyle?
81 See ESRIDGE, supra note 16, at 109-11.
82 See id. at 111-12.
83 1996 WL 694235, at *17-18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
84 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 112-14.
85 See id. at 115-16.
86 See id. at 116-18.
87 See id. at 118-20.
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cies on an ad hoc basis to accommodate same-sex couples.8 8 Allowing
same-sex marriage, after all, adjusts all pertinent policies in one fell
swoop through the simple process of redefinition of the pertinent
status.8 9
Eskridge next takes on the constitutional arguments concerning
same-sex marriage, 90 and he asserts that the existing case law is wrong
in concluding that neither due process nor equal protection princi-
ples developed under the Federal Constitution require the states to
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.9 1 After first sketching the
development of the constitutional privacy doctrine through cases on
sterilization and contraception, Eskridge turns his focus to Loving v.
Virginia92 and Zablocki v. RedhaiP3 and relies upon them as the key
sources of precedent for his argument.9 4 In Loving, the Supreme
Court struck down a state law penalizing interracial marriage on two
alternative grounds. First, the Court found that equal protection re-
quired strict scrutiny of the racial classification contained in Virginia's
marriage law. According to the Court, the state's justifications for its
law were insufficient to meet this standard of review, being concerned
primarily with maintaining white racial supremacy by preventing "race
mixing." Second, the Court held that the right to marry is a funda-
mental right protected by the Due Process Clause, once again invok-
ing strict scrutiny of any law that would block access to this right. The
Court elaborated on the second strand of Loving's analysis in Zablocki
and applied a strict scrutiny standard to strike down a Wisconsin law
requiring divorced residents to provide proof of compliance with any
outstanding child support obligations before they could obtain a new
marriage license. Eskridge concludes:
Zablocki establishes a doctrinal structure logically applicable to
other cases: A state law or practice that places a "direct legal obsta-
cle in the path of persons desiring to get married" denies those per-
sons the equal protection of the laws unless the state policy is
"supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tai-
lored to effectuate only those interests." This means that the bur-
den of persuasion as to same-sex marriage lies with the opponents.
The issue is not "Why gay marriage?" but is instead "Why not gay
marriage?"9 5
88 The prime example of a pragmatist who acknowledges the arguments in favor of
same-sex marriage but is unwilling to endorse it is Richard Posner. See RIcHARD POSNER,
SEX AND REASON 311-15 (1992).
89 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 120-22.
90 See id. at 123-52.
91 See id. at 124-42.
92 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
93 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
94 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 124-33.
95 Id. at 128 (quoting Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n.12, 388).
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Furthermore, the Court upheld the constitutional right of a pris-
oner to marry in Turner v. Safley.96 By acknowledging that the state
could refuse to allow prisoners to have sex with their spouses while
incarcerated, the Court implicitly rejected any contention that procre-
ation is an indispensable attribute of marriage. Eskridge emphasizes
that the Court is normally quite deferential to state authorities in rul-
ing on constitutional claims by prisoners, so its willingness to strike
down a state's ban on prisoner marriages clearly indicates that the
constitutional right to marry is a very strong one.9 7
In light of the strong arguments in favor of a constitutional right
to marry, why have state courts consistently rejected this claim?98 Es-
kridge observes that a significant early cluster of same-sex marriage
cases predated Zablocki and Turner, once these early cases were on the
books, it was easy for later courts to cite them as precedent disfavoring
same-sex marriage claims without having to engage in careful analysis
of new developments.9 9 The early cases, brought by individual liti-
gants rather than by public-interest law firms, lacked the kind of full
factual records characteristic of good test-case litigation, such as the
detailed record before the trial court on remand in Baehr.100 The uni-
versal right-to-marry claim has consistently been countered with the
assertion that the marital right is limited to couples who are at least
theoretically capable of procreation; courts brush aside the counter-
argument that the state allows sterile or celibate couples to marry as
irrelevant. 101 In addition, later courts have cited Bowers v. Hardwick as
96 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
97 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 129-30.
98 Even the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), re-
jected the argument that the Due Process Clause of the Hawaii Constitution embodies a
right to marry for same-sex couples. The court held that, under Hawaii precedents, it must
construe the Hawaiian Due Process Clause in parallel with the Federal Due Process Clause.
See id. at 56. Eskridge notes that the Baehr court construed Zablocki narrowly, and totally
ignored Turner, in reaching its conclusion that the ability to engage in procreational sex
was somehow a predicate for eligibility for marriage. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 131.
99 A good example of this phenomenon is In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684
(1990), affd, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993), in which the court relied on the reasoning
of Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), without discussing the intervening
Supreme Court decisions on marriage. Indeed, the court summoned Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), a case upholding Georgia's sodomy law against constitutional chal-
lenge, as support for the proposition that public policy did not require the state to author-
ize same-sex marriages.
100 In Baehr, the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. joined local trial
counsel at the appellate level and participated in planning and presenting the case on
remand before the trial court.
101 See Singer v. Ham, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (dismissing as an
exception heterosexual couples who are unable to produce children and stating that mar-
riage is a protected institution because of the value that society places on propagation);
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (explaining that the Supreme
Court recognized marriage as a fundamental right because of its connection to reproduc-
tion and that only heterosexual couples have the ability to procreate).
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a basis to deny the existence of a gay right to marry, a trend that Es-
kridge decries as a misuse of that decision.10 2
Eskridge then discusses the various justifications that states might
advance in attempting to satisfy the requirements of strict scrutiny. 03
He counters the most popular argument-the state interest in foster-
ing procreation-by arguing that excluding same-sex couples from
marriage does not advance this goal, because there is no evidence that
gays who cannot marry their same-sex partners will turn to opposite-
sex partners with whom they can conceive children simply in order to
marry.'0 4 He also discounts the claim that denial of same-sex mar-
riage rights might encourage bisexuals to marry opposite-sex partners
in order to procreate, arguing that, even if this claim is true, the total
effect on procreation would be "negligible" and hardly sufficient to
justify disqualifying large numbers of homosexuals from marrying.10 5
Eskridge gives only passing notice to the Hawaii Attorney Gen-
eral's centerpiece argument on remand in Baehr that the state has a
compelling interest in maximizing the possibility that children will be
raised in the best possible environment, namely the traditional family
environment. 06 Eskridge responds that no evidence supports the
state's contention that opposite-sex married couples provide the best
environment for raising children. As support, he cites studies showing
that children raised in two-parent lesbian households turned out as
well as those raised in traditional households, and tended to be psy-
chologically better off than children raised by single heterosexual
mothers.1 07
The various arguments raised by Hawaii and other states are, ac-
cording to Eskridge, makeweights for the most likely motivation be-
hind states' resistance to the legalization of same-sex marriage:
promotion of heterosexuality and the avoidance of creating an ap-
pearance of approval or sanction of homosexuality.108 Can "compul-
sory heterosexuality" 10 9 be a compelling state interest for purposes of
due process or equal protection review? Eskridge's negative response
102 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 136-37.
103 See id. at 13743.
104 See id. at 138-39.
105 See id. at 139.
106 See Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, at *3-10 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
107 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 139-40. Eskridge also effectively counters the argu-
ment raised by the Hawaii Attorney General that a tourist boycott of the state might result
from a court order requiring the state to authorize same-sex marriages, relying on a study
conducted by Professor Jennifer Brown. See id. at 14142 (discussing Jennifer Gerarda
Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995)). Brown argues that a small state with a tourist-centered economy
would enjoy a tourist income windfall of between $3 and $4 billion by virtue of being the
first state to allow same-sex marriage. See Brown, supra, at 834.
108 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 14243.
109 Id. at 143.
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is strengthened by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Romer v.
Evans,"0 in which the Supreme Court ruled out animus against homo-
sexuality as a legitimate state interest, thus striking down a measure
that specifically discriminated against homosexuals."' Eskridge fi-
nally rebuts the "slippery slope" argument-the proposition that al-
lowing same-sex marriage inevitably leads to allowing polygamous,
incestuous, and intergenerational (child/adult) marriages. 1 2 Here,
Eskridge's rebuttals are sometimes less convincing, partly because he
would allow some types of marriages, such as marriages between adult
cousins or adopted siblings who are not biologically related, that are
presently forbidden in most states." 3 Ultimately, however, Eskridge
demonstrates that there are sound reasons, unrelated to categorical
animus, that justify maintaining bans on such marriages even if states
allow same-sex marriages. 14
Eskridge devotes a separate chapter to explicating the rationale
adopted by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehrfor subjecting Hawaii's
marriage law to strict scrutiny: that excluding same-sex couples adopts
a sex-based classification that is constitutionally suspect. 115 He draws a
strong analogy between the race discrimination analysis employed by
the Supreme Court in Loving and the sex discrimination analysis
urged in Baehr.116 Eskridge emphasizes that in Loving the Supreme
Court rejected the same basic type of reasoning that courts have used
to sustain bans on same-sex marriage." 7 The state of Virginia sought
to "essentialize"'u 8 marriage by characterizing racially-mixed mar-
riages as "'unnatural, "'19 just as states resistant to same-sex marriage
have argued that marriage is, in essence, a heterosexual institution. 20
Eskridge argues that Loving's rejection of this attempt to "essentialize"
marriage is instructive for same-sex marriage cases.' 2 ' Critics of same-
sex marriage who say that marriage is strictly for opposite-sex
couples-because that's the true nature of marriage-fail to over-
110 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
111 See id. at 1628-29. Eskridge relies on the same cases that the Supreme Court relied
upon in Romer, most prominent among them being Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432 (1985), in which the Court stated that "objectives such as 'a bare... desire to
harm a politically unpopular group,' are not legitimate state interests." Id. at 446-47 (quot-
ing USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
112 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 144-52.
113 See ad at 151.
114 See id. at 144-51.
115 See id. at 153-82.
116 See id. at 153-54.
117 See i at 153-54.
118 Id.
119 Id- at 155 (quoting Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321, 324 (1869)).
120 See id. at 154.
121 Seei- at 159-62.
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come Lovings rejection of such definition-based arguments. 122 Fur-
thermore, Eskridge notes, the Court rejected Virginia's argument in
Loving by piercing the statute's polite language to find the unsavory
core justification: maintenance of a system of racial apartheid in Vir-
ginia. 123 The state of Virginia argued that because its miscegenation
law treated blacks and whites equally, there was literally no violation of
the principle of equal protection.124 The Court rejected this argu-
ment by holding that whenever the state uses race to classify people,
its purposes are suspect and thus require some racially-neutral justifi-
cation in order to sustain the law. 125 In this case, Virginia's only justi-
fication for the statute was clearly based on the principle of racial
supremacy, the desire by the white majority to avoid "mon-
grel[ization]" of the white race by preventing procreation by mixed-
race couples. 26
State denial of same-sex marriage erects a sex-based classification
just as miscegenation laws erect a race-based classification. Eskridge
maintains that the ban on same-sex marriage is even more discrimina-
tory than the ban on interracial marriage; the Virginia statute did not
entirely deny African-Americans the right to marry, only the right to
marry white people. 127 Although the law was maintained as an expres-
sion of racial supremacy, it did allow marriage within the stigmatized
group. To the contrary, bans on same-sex marriage completely de-
prive gay people of the right to marry within their own group as part
of the stigmatization process.' 28
Eskridge then advances the argument that discriminatory treat-
ment of lesbians and gay men by the government is actually a form of
sexism, intended to reinforce gender-role stereotyping. 29 The
Supreme Court has held that classifications reflecting "archaic and
stereotypic notions" 30 about the sexes are subject to heightened scru-
tiny under equal protection. 13' Eskridge shows how litigants can use
the Court's rulings to construct a theory under which policies that
have the effect of discriminating against gay people fall within the
122 See id. at 163.
123 See id. at 158-59.
124 See id. at 164.
125 See id. at 159.
126 See id. at 158-59.
127 See it. at 160.
128 See id. at 161.
129 See id. at 162-72.
130 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
131 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (employing heightened scrutiny to
strike down, as gender discrimination, a statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males
under 21 and to females under 18).
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sphere of anti-sex discrimination precedent. 3 2 Eskridge then argues
that sexual orientation discrimination itself raises issues of constitu-
tional dimensions (a point reinforced by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Romer) and analyzes the argument that anti-gay discrimina-
tion is actionable under the Equal Protection Clause.' 33
In his concluding chapter, Eskridge delves into the thoughts and
feelings underlying the persistent refusal of a large majority of the
public to embrace same-sex marriage, even in the face of such strong
logical arguments in its favor. 134 Ultimately, he contends that the an-
swer lies in America's ambivalence about sex, suggesting that although
American society has evolved to a position of "tolerance" of private
sexual practices, the public is not comfortable about public "flaunt-
ing" of sexuality that departs from the perceived mainstream. 3 5 In
effect, America has erected a double standard that tolerates open ex-
pressions of heterosexual desire but condemns open expressions of
homosexual desire.136 Some people may believe that officially sanc-
tioning same-sex marriages is tantamount to a license to flaunt "ab-
normal" behavior.
On the other hand, Eskridge contends, it seems clear that in a
society that exalts marriage and premises many important legal rights
and responsibilities on the marital status of a couple, maintaining the
current barrier against same-sex marriage relegates gay people to sec-
ond-class citizenship. 137 Eskridge concludes, ironically drawing on the
arguments of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, 138 that' "the
good state must be like the good parent. It must protect every citizen
in a fair and equal way, and it must invade no citizen's liberty just
because he or she is unpopular."'139 This definition of state parental
obligation requires the states to allow gay citizens to marry. "Justice as
well as law requires nothing less."'140
132 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 165-72. He does this with considerable help from
two law review articles on the relationship between gender and sexual orientation in consti-
tutional theory: Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994), and Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187.
133 See ESKUDGE, supra note 16, at 176-82.
134 See id. at 183-91.
135 See id at 183-85.
136 See id. at 185-88.
137 See id. at 188-90.
138 ForJustice Scalia's negative views on the issue of gay rights, see his dissenting opin-
ion in Romerv. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629-37 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139 EsKRUDGE, supra note 16, at 191 (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CI. L. Rr-v. 1175 (1989)).
140 Id. at 190-91.
1997]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
In The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, Professor Eskridge mounts a
strong logical argument for state recognition of same-sex mar-
riages.141 Some of the nuances of this argument are new, but numer-
ous law review articles and appellate briefs have voiced most of it
before. 142 Why has such a strong, logical case met with repeated rejec-
tion in the courts and outright hostility in state legislatures and Con-
gress? The answer must be that when it comes to marriage, logic is
not the prime motivator of the makers of public policy.
Marriage carries a symbolic value in our society that far tran-
scends the pragmatic considerations surrounding the decision
whether to allow same-sex couples to marry. Opponents of same-sex
marriage argue that allowing same-sex couples to marry will send a
signal that homosexuality is no longer an officially stigmatized phe-
nomenon, but rather a mere "difference," one of many that make up
the accepted diversity of the human condition, no more morally sig-
nificant than race or sex in determining human worth. The oppo-
nents are correct. This is why the campaign to win the right to
marriage for same-sex couples has emerged as the key issue for the
lesbian and gay rights movement in the 1990s. 14
141 As noted at the outset, Eskridge's book, developed from litigation materials used in
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995), is a Brandeis brief for same-sex
marriage. As such, it tends to underplay the alternative forms of recognition for lesbian
and gay families outside of marriage, although Eskridge does acknowledge them to some
extent. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
142 See Otis R. Damslet, Same-SexMarriage, 10 N.Y.L. ScH.J. HuM. RTs. 555 (1993); Rich-
ard J. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From Jim Crow to Same-Sex Marriages, 92 MICH.
L. REv. 2456 (1994);Jennifer L. Heeb, Homosexual Marriage, The Changing American Family,
and the Heterosexual Right to Privacy, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 347 (1993); William M. Hohen-
garten, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy, 103 YALE LJ. 1495 (1994); Christine Jax,
Same-Sex Marriage-Why Not?, 4 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 461 (1995); Scott K. Kozuma, Baehr v.
Lewin and Same Sex Marriage: The Continued Stragglefor Social, Political and Human Legitimacy,
30 WILAmEE L. REV. 891 (1994); Claudia A. Lewis, From this Day Forward: A Feminine
MoralDiscourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE LJ. 1783 (1988); Richard D. Mohr, The Case
for Gay Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POtL'y 215 (1995);JeffreyJ. Swart, The
Wedding Luau-Who is Invited?: Hawaii, Same-Sex Marriage, and Emerging Realities, 43 EMORY
LJ. 1577 (1994); ErikJ. Toulon, Call the Caterer:. Hawaii to Host First Same-Sex Marriage, 3 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 109 (1993);James Trosino, American Wedding: Same-Sex Mar-
riage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93 (1993); Kevin Aloysius Zambrowicz,
"To Love and Honor All the Days of Your Life: A Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage?, 43
CATH. U. L. REv. 907 (1994).
143 More than a decade ago, Professor G. Sidney Buchanan made this point quite
forcefully. See G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYrON L.
REv. 541 (1985). Buchanan argued:
If the government may not distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex
conduct in the area of marriage, it is difficult to use the societal interest in
protecting and fostering the marriage institution as a basis for justifying
that distinction in other areas of the civil law. In this sense, therefore, the
same-sex marriage issue is a linchpin issue. If it is resolved against the
power of government to limit marriage to opposite-sex unions, against the
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Is it naive to believe that the goal of granting same-sex couples
the right to marry-the right to be accepted as equals with their oppo-
site-sex peers-might actually be achieved soon? Perhaps so, but the
progress of the Baehr case and the slow changing of minds that may
accompany its unfolding suggest that what would have appeared a
pipe dream to gay activists of the 1950s now appears within grasp.
One regrets that those who most need to see the full array of evidence
Eskridge sets forth so compellingly are those least likely to read it:
those who have not fully made up their minds and are open to persua-
sion through logical argument. For readers already inclined toward
governmental recognition of same-sex marriage, the book provides a
powerful confirmation that such a result would be consistent with our
constitutional principles and ultimately beneficial to American society
as a whole.
power of government to confine marriage to its traditional opposite-sex
moorings, then the legal system, as a practical matter, will have lost its ca-
pacity to make distinctions between same-sex and opposite-sex conduct in
any walk of life. Government would be constitutionally straijacketed into a
requirement of total equality in the regulation of same-sex and opposite-sex
conduct.
Id. at 544.
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